At the same time, there are great harms and challenges that arise from AIs rapid development. As a result, there is no conflict between self-interest and mutual benefit, and the dominant strategy of both actors would be to defect. %PDF-1.7 % The Stag Hunt represents an example of compensation structure in theory. [16], On one hand, these developments outline a bright future. [8] Elsa Kania, Beyond CFIUS: The Strategic Challenge of Chinas Rise in Artificial Intelligence, Lawfare, June 20, 2017, https://www.lawfareblog.com/beyond-cfius-strategic-challenge-chinas-rise-artificial-intelligence (highlighting legislation considered that would limit Chinese investments in U.S. artificial intelligence companies and other emerging technologies considered crucial to U.S. national security interests). If participation is not universal, they cannot surround the stag and it escapes, leaving everyone that hunted stag hungry. Here, I also examine the main agenda of this paper: to better understand and begin outlining strategies to maximize coordination in AI development, despite relevant actors varying and uncertain preferences for coordination. This is what I will refer to as the AI Coordination Problem. [30] Greg Allen and Taniel Chan, Artificial Intelligence and National Security. Report for Harvard Kennedy School: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, July 2017, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/AI%20NatSec%20-%20final.pdf: 71-110. Meanwhile, the harm that each actor can expect to receive from an AI Coordination Regime consists of both the likelihood that the actor themselves will develop a harmful AI times that harm, as well as the expected harm of their opponent developing a harmful AI. The article states that the only difference between the two scenarios is that the localized group decided to hunt hares more quickly. Half a stag is better than a brace of rabbits, but the stag will only be brought down with a . [32] Paul Mozur, Beijing Wants A.I. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified . For the painting about stag hunting, see, In this symmetric case risk dominance occurs if (. However, in Deadlock, the prospect of both actors defecting is more desirable than both actors cooperating. In the long term, environmental regulation in theory protects us all, but even if most of the countries sign the treaty and regulate, some like China and the US will not forsovereigntyreasons, or because they areexperiencinggreat economic gain. 8,H7kcn1qepa0y|@. This makes the risk twofold; the risk that the stag does not appear, and the risk that another hunter takes the kill. Is human security a useful approach to security? See Katja Grace, John Salvatier, Allan Dafoe, Baobao Zhang, & Owain Evans, When Will AI Exceed Human Performance? On a separate piece of paper, write the best possible answer for each one. September 21, 2015 | category: [58] Downs et al., Arms Races and Cooperation, 143-144. Because of its capacity to radically affect military and intelligence systems, AI research becomes an important consideration in national security and would unlikely be ignored by political and military leaders. The stag is the reason the United States and its NATO allies grew concerned with Afghanistans internal political affairs in the first place, and they remain invested in preventing networks, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, from employing Afghan territory as a base. Donna Franks, an accountant for Southern Technologies Corporation, discovers that her supervisor, Elise Silverton, made several errors last year. It is his argument: "The information that such an agreement conveys is not that the players will keep it (since it is not binding), but that each wants the other to keep it." A relevant strategy to this insight would be to focus strategic resources on shifting public or elite opinion to recognize the catastrophic risks of AI. Depending on the payoff structures, we can anticipate different likelihoods of and preferences for cooperation or defection on the part of the actors. As a result, this tradeoff between costs and benefits has the potential to hinder prospects for cooperation under an AI Coordination Regime. The payoff matrix would need adjusting if players who defect against cooperators might be punished for their defection. It is also the case that some human interactions that seem like prisoner's dilemmas may in fact be stag hunts. Absolute gains looks at the total effect of the decision while relative gains only looks at the individual gains in respect to others. [4] Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford University Press, 2014). Table 2. 0000002169 00000 n Interestingly enough, the Stag Hunt theory can be used to describe social contracts within society, with the contract being the one to hunt the stag or achieve mutual benefit. Scholars of civil war have argued, for example, that peacekeepers can preserve lasting cease-fires by enabling warring parties to cooperate with the knowledge that their security will be guaranteed by a third party. [2] Tom Simonite, Artificial Intelligence Fuels New Global Arms Race, Wired., September 8, 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/for-superpowers-artificial-intelligence-fuels-new-global-arms-race/. These remain real temptations for a political elite that has survived decades of war by making deals based on short time horizons and low expectations for peace. 15. The payoff matrix in Figure 1 illustrates a generic stag hunt, where Hunting stags is quite challenging and requires mutual cooperation. Using the payoff matrix in Table 6, we can simulate scenarios for AI coordination by assigning numerical values to the payoff variables. HW?n9*K$kBOQiBo1d\QlQ%AAW\gQV#j^KRmEB^]L6Rw4muu.G]a>[U/h;@ip|=PS[nyfGI0YD+FK:or+:=y&4i'kvC The corresponding payoff matrix is displayed as Table 10. We have recently seen an increase in media acknowledgement of the benefits of artificial intelligence (AI), as well as the negative social implications that can arise from its development. Hume's second example involves two neighbors wishing to drain a meadow. Advanced AI technologies have the potential to provide transformative social and economic benefits like preventing deaths in auto collisions,[17] drastically improving healthcare,[18] reducing poverty through economic bounty,[19] and potentially even finding solutions to some of our most menacing problems like climate change.[20]. Each can individually choose to hunt a stag or hunt a hare. Intriligator and Brito[38] argue that qualitative/technological races can lead to greater instability than quantitative races. Understanding the Stag Hunt Game: How Deer Hunting Explains Why People are Socially Late. War is anarchic, and intervening actors can sometimes help to mitigate the chaos. 2 Examples of states include the United States, Germany, China, India, Bolivia, South Africa, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam. In addition to the pure strategy Nash equilibria there is one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. International Relations Classical Realism- Morganthau- anarchy is assumed as a prominent concern in international relations,with the international Stag Hunt The corresponding payoff matrix is displayed as Table 14. Most prominently addressed in Nick Bostroms Superintelligence, the creation of an artificial superintelligence (ASI)[24] requires exceptional care and safety measures to avoid developing an ASI whose misaligned values and capacity can result in existential risks for mankind. Specifically, it is especially important to understand where preferences of vital actors overlap and how game theory considerations might affect these preferences. For example, if the players could flip a coin before choosing their strategies, they might agree to correlate their strategies based on the coin flip by, say, choosing ballet in the event of heads and prize fight in the event of tails. Other names for it or its variants include "assurance game", "coordination game", and "trust dilemma". 0000003027 00000 n <> 0000016685 00000 n [44] Thomas C. Schelling & Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control. This additional benefit is expressed here as P_(b|A) (A)b_A. ? If, by contrast, the prospect of a return to anarchy looms, trust erodes and short-sighted self-interest wins the day. Two hunters can either jointly hunt a stag (an adult deer and rather large meal) or individually hunt a rabbit (tasty, but substantially less filling). What should Franks do? Read the following questions. You note that the temptation to cheat creates tension between the two trading nations, but you could phrase this much more strongly: theoretically, both players SHOULD cheat. But, at various critical junctures, including the countrys highly contentious presidential elections in 2009 and 2014, rivals have ultimately opted to stick with the state rather than contest it. Furthermore, a unilateral strategy could be employed under a Prisoners Dilemma in order to effect cooperation. (e.g., including games such as Chicken and Stag Hunt). What are some good examples of coordination games? 0000006962 00000 n In short, the theory suggests that the variables that affect the payoff structure of cooperating or defecting from an AI Coordination Regime determine which model of coordination we see arise between the two actors (modeled after normal-form game setups). If both choose to row they can successfully move the boat. {\displaystyle a>b\geq d>c} Not wanting to miss out on the high geopolitical drama, Moscow invited Afghanistans former president, Hamid Karzai, and a cohort of powerful elitesamong them rivals of the current presidentto sit down with a Taliban delegation last week. Based on the values that each actor assigns to their payoff variables, we can expect different coordination models (Prisoners Dilemma, Chicken, Deadlock, or Stag Hunt) to arise. Additionally, Koubi[42] develops a model of military technological races that suggests the level of spending on research and development varies with changes in an actors relative position in a race. I will apply them to IR and give an example for each. Author James Cambias describes a solution to the game as the basis for an extraterrestrial civilization in his 2014 science fiction book A Darkling Sea. [55] See also Bostrom, Superintelligence at Chapter 14. Prisoners Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Battle of the Sexes, and Chicken are discussed in our text. It is not clear whether the errors were deliberate or accidental. As a result, concerns have been raised that such a race could create incentives to skimp on safety. So it seems that, while we still are motivated by own self-interest, the addition of social dynamics to the two-person Stag Hunt game leads to a tendency of most people agreeing to hunt the stag. It comes with colossal opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict. [15] Sam Byford, AlphaGo beats Lee Se-dol again to take Google DeepMind Challenge series, The Verge, March 12, 2016, https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/12/11210650/alphago-deepmind-go-match-3-result. This could be achieved through signaling lack of effort to increase an actors military capacity (perhaps by domestic bans on AI weapon development, for example). An example of the game of Stag Hunt can be illustrated by neighbours with a large hedge that forms the boundary between their properties. It sends a message to the countrys fractious elites that the rewards for cooperation remain far richer than those that would come from going it alone. As is customary in game theory, the first number in each cell represents how desirable the outcome is for Row (in this case, Actor A), and the second number represents how desirable the same outcome is for Column (Actor B). See Carl Shulman, Arms Control and Intelligence Explosions, 7th European Conference on Computing and Philosophy, Bellaterra, Spain, July 24, 2009: 6. in . Image: The Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Division at the Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar. If either hunts a stag alone, the chance of success is minimal. Dipali Mukhopadhyay is an associate professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University and the author of Warlords, Strongman Governors, and the State in Afghanistan (Cambridge University Press, 2014). 0 [40] Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30, 2 (1978): 167-214. Let us call a stag hunt game where this condition is met a stag hunt dilemma. The dilemma is that if one hunter waits, he risks one of his fellows killing the hare for himself, sacrificing everyone else. Table 11. It is the goal this paper to shed some light on these, particularly how the structure of preferences that result from states understandings of the benefits and harms of AI development lead to varying prospects for coordination. 0000016501 00000 n While there is certainly theoretical value in creating a single model that can account for all factors and answer all questions inherent to the AI Coordination Problem, this is likely not tractable or useful to attempt at least with human hands and minds alone. [56] look at three different types of strategies governments can take to reduce the level of arms competition with a rival: (1) a unilateral strategy where an actors individual actions impact race dynamics (for example, by focusing on shifting to defensive weapons[57]), (2) a tacit bargaining strategy that ties defensive expenditures to those of a rival, and (3) a negotiation strategy composed of formal arms talks. The payoff matrix is displayed as Table 12. In recent years, artificial intelligence has grown notably in its technical capacity and in its prominence in our society. [18] Deena Zaidi, The 3 most valuable applications of AI in health care, VentureBeat, April 22, 2018, https://venturebeat.com/2018/04/22/the-3-most-valuable-applications-of-ai-in-health-care/. To begin exploring this, I now look to the literature on arms control and coordination. This is why international tradenegotiationsare often tense and difficult. In this model, each actors incentives are not fully aligned to support mutual cooperation and thus should present worry for individuals hoping to reduce the possibility of developing a harmful AI. Gray[36] defines an arms race as two or more parties perceiving themselves to be in an adversary relationship, who are increasing or improving their armaments at a rapid rate and structuring their respective military postures with a general attain to the past, current, and anticipated military and political behaviour of the other parties.. [11] In our everyday lives, we store AI technology as voice assistants in our pockets[12] and as vehicle controllers in our garages. "Game Theory for International Accords." d This article is about the game theory problem about stag hunting. [8] If truly present, a racing dynamic[9] between these two actors is a cause for alarm and should inspire strategies to develop an AI Coordination Regime between these two actors. The Stag Hunt The Stag Hunt is a story that became a game. [25] For more on the existential risks of Superintelligence, see Bostrom (2014) at Chapters 6 and 8. In these abstractions, we assume two utility-maximizing actors with perfect information about each others preferences and behaviors. Table 6 Payoff Matrix for AI Coordination Scenarios, Where P_h (A)h [D,D]>P_h (A)h [D,C]>P_h (AB)h [C,C]. In the context of international relations, this model has been used to describe preferences of actors when deciding to enter an arms treaty or not. xref This table contains an ordinal representation of a payoff matrix for a Prisoners Dilemma game. Actor As preference order: DC > DD > CC > CD, Actor Bs preference order: CD > DD > CC > DC. SUBJECT TERMS Game Theory, Brinkmanship, Stag Hunt, Taiwan Strait Issue, Cuban Missile Crisis 16. the 'inherent' right to individual and collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter and enforcement measures involving the use of force sanctioned by the Security Council under Chapter VII thereof. This is taken to be an important analogy for social cooperation. Weiss, Uri, and Joseph Agassi. Uncategorized, Mail (will not be published) (lljhrpc). to Be Made in China by 2030, The New York Times, July 20, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/business/china-artificial-intelligence.html, [33] Kania, Beyond CFIUS: The Strategic Challenge of Chinas Rise in Artificial Intelligence., [34] McKinsey Global Institute, Artificial Intelligence: The Next Digital Frontier.. [28] Once this Pandoras Box is opened, it will be difficult to close. [54] In a bilateral AI development scenario, the distribution variable can be described as an actors likelihood of winning * percent of benefits gained by winner (this would be reflected in the terms of the Coordination Regime). }}F:,EdSr In this section, I survey the relevant background of AI development and coordination by summarizing the literature on the expected benefits and harms from developing AI and what actors are relevant in an international safety context. In international relations, countries are the participants in the stag hunt. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, in contrast, despite the fact that both players cooperating is Pareto efficient, the only pure Nash equilibrium is when both players choose to defect. The reason is because the traditional PD game does not fully capture the strategic options and considerations available to each player. Here, values are measured in utility. Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate Created Date: 20160809151831Z SCJ Int'l L. & Bus. Since the payoff of hunting the stags is higher, these interactions lead to an environment in which the Stag Hunters prosper. %PDF-1.3 % These differences create four distinct models of scenarios we can expect to occur: Prisoners Dilemma, Deadlock, Chicken, and Stag Hunt. and other examples to illustrate how game theory might be applied to understand the Taiwan Strait issue. Name four key thinkers of the theory of non-violent resistance, Gandhi, martin luther king, malcon X, cesar chavex. These are a few basic examples of modeling IR problems with game theory. We can see through studying the Stag Hunt game theory that, even though we are selfish, we still are ironically aiming to for mutual benefit, and thus we tend to follow a such a social contract. [6] See infra at Section 2.2 Relevant Actors. But who can we expect to open the Box? A great example of chicken in IR is the Cuban Missile Crisis. PxF`4f$CN*}S -'2Y72Dl0%^JOG?Y,XT@ dF6l]+$.~Qrjj}46.#Z x^iyY2)/c lLU[q#r)^X Together, these elements in the arms control literature suggest that there may be potential for states as untrusting, rational actors existing in a state of international anarchy to coordinate on AI development in order to reduce future potential global harms. Moreover, they also argue that pursuing all strategies at once would also be suboptimal (or even impossible due to mutual exclusivity), making it even more important to know what sort of game youre playing before pursuing a strategy[59]. [52] In the context of developing an AI Coordination Regime, recognizing that two competing actors are in a state of Deadlock might drive peace-maximizing individuals to pursue de-escalation strategies that differ from other game models. The best response correspondences are pictured here. In this example, each player has a dominantstrategy. The hedge is shared so both parties are responsible for maintaining it. [49] For example, by defecting from an arms-reduction treaty to develop more weapons, an actor can gain the upper hand on an opponent who decides to uphold the treaty by covertly continuing or increasing arms production. As a result, it is important to consider deadlock as a potential model that might explain the landscape of AI coordination. But, after nearly two decades of participation in the countrys fledgling democratic politics, economic reconstruction and security-sector development, many of these strongmen have grown invested in the Afghan states survival and the dividends that they hope will come with greater peace and stability. Put another way, the development of AI under international racing dynamics could be compared to two countries racing to finish a nuclear bomb if the actual development of the bomb (and not just its use) could result in unintended, catastrophic consequences. Finally, in the game of chicken, two sides race to collision in the hopes that the other swerves from the path first. As discussed, there are both great benefits and harms to developing AI, and due to the relevance AI development has to national security, it is likely that governments will take over this development (specifically the US and China). Downs et al. [52] Stefan Persson, Deadlocks in International Negotiation, Cooperation and Conflict 29, 3(1994): 211244. Another example is the hunting practices of orcas (known as carousel feeding). 0000018184 00000 n The Stag Hunt game, derived from Rousseaus story, describes the following scenario: a group of two or more people can cooperate to hunt down the more rewarding stag or go their separate ways and hunt less rewarding hares. As a result, a rational actor should expect to cooperate. In this game "each player always prefers the other to play c, no matter what he himself plays. 16 (2019): 1. HtV]o6*l_\Ek=2m"H)$]feV%I,/i~==_&UA0K=~=,M%p5H|UJto%}=#%}U[-=nh}y)bhQ:*&#HzF1"T!G i/I|P&(Jt92B5*rhA"4 Because of the instantaneous nature of this particular game, we can anticipate its occurrence to be rare in the context of technology development, where opportunities to coordinate are continuous. Schelling and Halperin[44] offer a broad definition of arms control as all forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it.. 4 thoughts on " The Six-Party Talks as a Game Theoretic 'Stag-Hunt' (2): For example international relations-if the people made international decisions stag hunt, chicken o International relations is a perfect example of an Cooperation under the security dilemma.
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